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RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS IN THE NEW YORK COURTS"
GEORGE D. HORNSTEINt
THE corporate form during the past century has become simply a
business device readily available to all, although historically the crea-
tion of a corporation, with the spelling out of its stockholders' rights, was
a deliberate act of a sovereign power. This new freedom has resulted
in the formation of a great variety of corporate structures and the form-
ulation of charter provisions frequently seeking to nullify the interests
of those most concerned-the investors.
This article will analyze the "bundle of rights" which the stockholder
receives in return for his capital contribution and will study the extent
to which he is able to enforce these rights in court. The latter examina-
tion will be confined to the decisions of a single year-1946, for one
state--New York, the forum for most corporate litigation, and will
concentrate on recurrent corporate problems.'
THE STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO MANAGE CORPORATE AFFAIRS
I
The principal right of stockholders is collectively to manage the .cor-
poration by voting at the election of directors, except where the stock-
holders have surrendered that right, an exception which unfortunately has
become very extensive. The investing public, in some cases by accept-
ing non-voting stock or stock subject to a voting trust, in others by ac-
cepting stock with disproportionately small voting powers, has made
the capital contribution in exchange for engraved sheets of paper of
scarcely more value, from the 'management standpoint, than the chips
or counters used in children's games.
There is little that can be done to help those who have surrendered to
promoters-without consideration-their right of management, the
principal right originally exchanged for the contribution of capital.
* The following article is the substance of an address delivered on April 1, 1947, under
the auspices of the Committee on Post Admission Legal Education of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York. A report of the address also appears in 117 N.Y.LJ.
1648 et seq. (April 28-May 2, 1947).
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Significant both for law and practice are many court decisions which never reach
the Reports-and hence never reach the digests usually employed by lawyers. In New York
decisions of the Supreme Court for the counties in and around New York City are printed
'in the New York Law Journal, a daily newspaper. The proportion of Law Journal deci-
sions which reach the printed reports in Miscellaneous or New York Supplement is larger
for corporate than non-corporate decisions, but approximately half are still to be found
only in the Law Journal. Of 155 corporate decisions which I have noted for the year 1946,
74 were Law Journal opinions not otherwise reported.
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Only in the gas and electric utility companies has the Federal Govern-
ment found a basis for compelling changes in existing corporate struc-
tures which "unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among
security holders." 2
There have also been a few recent isolated efforts to prevent the is-
suance of non-voting stock, but these restrictions look only to the future
and are limited to securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 3
to investment companies, 4 to corporations reorganized under the
Chandler Act,5 or to corporations in Illinois and North Carolina.; In
all other instances the various devices invented to protect the manage-
ment against ouster have received the sanction of court and state, and
are now classified as "legal devices" for the separation of ownership and
control.
With the exceptions noted, the law permits a stockholder to surrender
forever his right to vote; but if he gives it up temporarily-by way of a
voting trust-the law solicitously steps in and prescribes the maximum
period, usually 10 years.7 During the period set for the voting trust, the
power given the voting trustees is irrevocable. What can be done if the
voting trustees are reluctant to give up their powers after the period
set by the Voting Trust Agreement has run out? In the only such case
in New York during the past year, the court gave relief by compelling
the voting trustees to give proxies to the beneficial owners, thus ena-
bling them to elect a new set of Directors.8
A deliberate surrender of the individual holder's normal rights with
respect to his stock is sometimes effected by a written agreement signed
by all the stockholders of a corporation-a situation which can arise
only in a "close" corporation (a short-hand designation for a closely-
held enterprise). During the past year, such agreements were disclosed
in six cases, and in all, none of which went up on appeal, the stockhold-
ers' agreement was enforced. Five of these cases involved restrictions
2. PUBLIC UTILrn HOLDING COmPANY Acr OF 1935 § 11 (b) (2), 49 STAT. 821
(1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k (b) (2) (1940).
3. The New York Stock Exchange in a printed statement, dated May 4, 1940, re-
ported that since 1926 it has refused t9 list non-voting common stock.
4. INVESTMENT CouPAxy AcT § 18(i), 54 STAT. 817, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1940)
(requiring that in the capital structure of any investment company set up after the date of
the Act every share of stock must have voting rights).
5. CHANDLER Acr §216 (12) (a), 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C §616 (12) (a)
(1940) (requiring that all stock of corporations reorganized under the Act carry voting
privileges.)
6. Denial of voting power to any class of stock is prohibited in Illinois by statute
(ILu. Bus. Coas'. Acr § 14) and in North Carolina by judicial decision. Sheppard v.
Rockingham Power Co., 150 N.C. 776, 64 S.E. 894 (1909), and cases therein listed.
7. N.Y. STocx Co". LAW § 50.
8. In re Atlantic City Ambassador Hotel Corp., 62 N.Y.S2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1946,
Botein, J.).
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on .the alienability of stock.' The sixth alone involved voting rights.
In this last interesting case, Special Term (the motion part of the Su-
preme Court) upheld the sufficiency of a complaint by a 25% stockhold-
er who, on the basis of a stockholders' agreement assuring her one
director, had asked that the other stockholders be required to cast their
votes for her choice of one director."0 Thus, despite the pall cast on
stockholders' agreements by the decision in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotl.,
Inc.,"1 these agreements, when properly limited, cofitinue to be upheld,
In cases where the right to vote remains unimpaired in the stockhold-
ers, a variety of problems may be presented for judicial determination.
The seven applications to regulate or test corporate elections considered
by the New York courts in 1946 are illustrative.
One of these cases, the only one to reach the Appellate Division,
posed the question of who has the right to vote, the owner of stock or a
person to whom it has been pledged. The appellate court held that
the right remains vested in the owner where there is no express agree-
ment to the contrary. 12
Two decisions involved the calling of a special meeting of the stock-
holders. In one case, the court refused to call a special meeting, duly
requested in accordance with the by-laws, because a regular meeting
was scheduled to take place in a month anyway." In another case, the
court refused to enjoin the holding of a special meeting, saying that
9. Oppenheim Collins & Co., Inc. v. Beir, 187 Misc. 428, 64 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct.
1946, Schreiber, J.) ; Ionic Shop, Inc. v. Rothfeld, 64 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Hecht,
J.) ; In re Block's Will, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct. 1946, Henderson, Surr.);
Estate of Alfred Jacobs, 115 N.Y.L.J. 696 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 20, 1946, Delehanty, J.) ; Peets
v. Manhasset Civil Engineers, Inc., et at., 68 N.Y.S.2d. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Livingston,
J.). In the case last cited, the court later held that the restriction on alienation in a stock-
holders' agreement cannot be availed of by one who was not a stockholder at the time of
the agreement, who was not a party to it, and whose acquisition of stock after the date of
the agreement was directly from the corporation which had also not been a party to the
agreement. The court pointed out that neither the certificate of incorporation, the by-laws,
nor the stock certificates contained any reference to the agreement between the original
stockholders. Peets v. Manhasset Civil Engineers, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1946,
Stoddart, J.).-
10. Binon v. Boel, 64 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Miller, J.),
11. 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945). This important decision by the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that an agreement signed by all stockholders (1) may provide that
the by-laws may be amended only by unanimous vote of the stockholders, (2 and 3) may
noi provide that no stockholders' resolution should be adopted, or directors be elected, ex-
cept by unanimous vote of the stockholders, and (4) may not provide that no resolution of
the directors should be adopted except by unanimous vote of the directors. Three of the
seven judges in the Court of Appeals dissented from the holding that the provision num-
bered 4 in the above list was improper, but concurred in the rulings on the other questions
presented.
12. Fisk Discount Corp. v. Brooklyn Taxicab Trans. Co., 270 App. Div. 491, 60
N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dept. 1946).
13. Reilly v. Detmold, 60 N.Y. S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1946, McLaughlin, J.).
[Vol, 56: 942
1947] RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS IN NEW YORK COURTS 945
nothing harmful could occur at the meeting since the stockholders were
evenly divided. 14
Four cases involved the court's power, under § 25 of the General Cor-
poration Law, to set aside an election of directors. In one, the court set
aside the election. 15 In another, a referee was asked to report whether
the meeting had really been held and whether the petitioner had re-
ceived prior notice of the meeting."6 In a third, the court refused to set
aside the results of a special meeting because, said the court, it would
be futile: the complainants, as minority stockholders, could achieve
nothing even were a new election ordered.17 In a fourth case, a "foreign
corporation" was involved. The New York court declined to take juris-
diction despite the fact that the corporation's principal place of business
was in New York and all of the individual defendants were residents
there. 18
The power to vote foi" directors has been described by the New York
Court of Appeals as the stockholder's "supreme right and main protec-
tion."'-9 With only one exception, however, every case on this subject
in New York in 1946 involved a family or "close" corporation, and a
"close" corporation is usually a small one. In the case of large corpora-
tions, this important question is too often put beyond the reach of the
court when the corporation is first organized.
II
A second feature of the stockholder's right to manage the corporation
is his right to inspect the corporate books--ordinarily to ascertain the
true value of his stock, to gauge the success and honesty of the corpo-
rate managers, or to learn the names of his fellow stockholders. But as
in the case of the right to vote for directors, the surrender by prospec-
tive stockholders of their right to inspection is often arranged by the
promoters and their attorneys when the corporation's charter is drafted.
This practice was dramatically illustrated in 1946 by the statement of
a vice-president of General Motors Corporation who declared, when the
UAW (CIO) wanted to examine the books of that corporation: "We
don't even open our books to our stockholders." 1 '
14. D.C.K. Realty Corp. v. Katz, 115 N. Y. L. J. 2365 (Sup. Ct. June 14, 1946,
Church, 3.).
15. In re Siegal & Milton, Inc., 115 N.Y.L.J. 1360 (Sup. Ct. April 6, 1946, Gavagan,
J.).
16. I re Dodgett, 115 N.Y.L.J. 2382 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 1946, Hammer, J.).
17. MAtter of Metagraphic Corp., 115 N.Y.L.J. 2347 (Sup. Ct. June 13, 1946, Steuer,
J.).
18. Rohlsen v. Latin American Airways, Inc. 65 N.Y.S2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Botein,
J.).
19. Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 296, 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (1906).
20. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 1, col. 1 (statement by Harry W. Anderson).
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The charter of General Motors does contain a provision reading as
follows: t
"No stockholder shall have any right to inspect any account or
book or document of the Corporation, except as conferred by
statute or authorized by the Board of Directors or by a resolution
of the stockholders."
A recent study of 100 of the country's very large corporations showed
that all but two of the twenty-seven incorporated in Delaware con-
tained in their charters or by-laws a limitation similar to the "no inspec-
tion" provision quoted above 1.2 These statistics are especially interest-
ing because even the Delaware courts have declared this provision
invalid.22
Why, then, does the draftsman continue to include in a corporate
charter a provision which the courts have declared void? I suspect it is
for use on a stockholder or his attorney who does not realize the inva-
lidity of the charter limitation.
The right to inspect-which the courts do not permit to be waived-
is a common law right, existing independent of statute.2 3 Statutes on
the subject, although they frequently appear, are rarely utilized because
the common law right is much more extensive. Under the New York
statutes, for example, to compel inspection of a list of stockholders, a
stockholder must either own 5% of the stock or if he is a smaller stock-
holder, must have been a stockholder for at least six months ;24 to re-
quire a financial statement a stockholder must own 3% of the stock. 26
None of these prerequisites applies when the application is based upon
the stockholder's inherent common law right. Nor, as is widely believed,
need the application to inspect be made in conjunction with a stockhold-
er's suit; the information may be and most often is sought by an appli-
cation in the nature of mandamus, in New York under Article 78 of the
Civil Practice Act.
During 1946 there was one application for a financial statement-
sought under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, which was not sub-
mitted pursuant to Section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law because
the petitioner had already had one statement within the year. The re-
spondent wisely offered to permit an inspection, which the petitioner
21. Koenigsberg, Provisions in Corporate Charters and By-laws Governing the In-
spection of Books by Stockholders, 30 Gao. L. J. 227, 244 (1942).
22. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 4 Harr. 81, 143 Atl. 257 (Del, 1926);
Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N.E. 764 (1915).
23. Durr et a. v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967 (1936) ; In re
Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
24. N.Y. STocx CoRp. LAW § 10.
25. Id. § 77.
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declined because of the expense. The court thereupon, and, I believe,
properly refused to orcer a second financial statement.
During the past year there came to my attention no less than fifteen
applications by stockholders, under Article 78,2 seeking a general in-
spection of corporate books. Special Term immediately ordered the
full inspection on most of the applications, covering both large and
small corporations.2 Of the decisions granting an inspection, only
three went to the Appellate Division, and all three were affirmed with-
out opinion.2 One of the .rulings so affirmed was made by Judge Hof-
stadter who had said: "The instant case is another illustration of the
familiar situation in modem business, where a minority, stockholder
discovers that the prosperity of a corporation, for some unknon rea-
son, does not redound to his personal advantage." The Judge ruled that
the stockholder was entitled to inspect the books and learn the reason
for the "failure of the corporate affluence to trickle through to its stock-
holders."3 0
In a fourth case to reach the Appellate Division, the lower court had
refused to permit an inspection because the respondent charged that the
petitioner sought "a fishing expedition" to discover something on the
basis of which suit might be instituted. The denial of the application
was promptly reversed by the Appellate Division."
Since almost the only basis for the court's refusing an inspection is
that the petitioner is not acting in good faith, this defense is interposed
in almost every litigated application. During the past year it was
pleaded in opposition to an application made on behalf of the owner of
a 50% stock interest which the petitioner had inherited from her father.
Since the applicant had never been anything but a housewife, the court
26. Feinberg et a[ v. Enselberg, 63 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Froessel, J.).
27. Cf. application by director, apparently not a stockholder, in Application of Hafter,
67 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Cohalan, J.), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 995, 62 N.Y.S2d 851
(1st Dept. 1946).
28. In re McMorris, 115 N.Y.L.J. 1324 (Sup. Ct. April 4, 1946, Gavagan, J.) (Carib-
bean Sons, Inc.); Matter of Spanierman, 115 N.Y.L.J. 1428 (Sup. Ct. April 11, 1946,
Church, J.) (Crescent Plaza Corp.) ; In re Siegel, 115 N.Y.L.J. 2249 (Sup. Ct. June 6,
1946, Fennelly, J.) (Park Terrace Cafe, Inc.); Salter Y. Columbia Concerts, Inc. 116
N.Y.L.J. 65 (Sup. Ct. July 11, 1946, Cohalan, J.); Halperin v. Air King Products Co.,
Inc., 59 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Hallinan, J.); Schacher v. G. Taus & Sons, Inc.,
et al. 67 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Froessel, J.).
29. Singer v. State Laundry, 116 N.Y.L.J. 835 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1946, Hooley, J.),
aff'd, 271 App. Div. 837, 66 N.Y.S.2d 644 (2nd Dept. 1947); Matter of Bergstein, 270
App. Div. 834, 61. N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dept. 1946) ; Matter of Oltarsh, 115 N.Y.L.J. 2011
(Sup. Ct. May 21, 1946, Hofstadter, J.), affd, 271 App. Div. 772, 65 N.Y.S2d 278 (1st
Dept. 1946), leave to appeal denied, 271 App. Div. 815, 66 N.Y.S2d 410 (1st Dept. 1946).
30. Matter of Oltarsh, 115 N.Y.L.J. 2011 (Sup. Ct. May 21, 1946, Hofstadter, J.).
31. Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 271 App. Div. 870, 66 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Ist Dept. 1946);
Friedman v. Odora Co., Inc., 271 App. Div. 875, 67 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Ist Dept. 1946).
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found it difficult to see upon what ground bad faith could be predicated,
and forthwith granted an inspection.3 2 The incident, however, illus-
trates the ubiquity of this defense. Where there appears to be any sub-
stance to this objection, the court orders a preliminary trial on the issue
of petitioner's good faith. 13 However, there has not come to my atten-
tion a single decision during the past year in which the defense of peti-
tioner's lack of good faith caused an examination to be denied, although
in one case this objection did result in the inspection's being limited.34
Only in two of the fifteen applications was a general inspection of the
books completely denied; in one case the court found that jurisdiction
was lacking over the defendant, a foreign corporation;3 and in the
other, the petitioner's desire to see the books was admittedly not moti-
vated by her interest as a stockholder but solely by her expectation of
information for use in a personal claim against the corporation.3"
There are, nowadays, very few cases where the petitioner seeks not a
general inspection of the books, but only a list of the stockholders. In
one such case during the past year, a preliminary trial was ordered to
determine the petitioner's good faith ;3 in a second case, the inspection
was denied because the application was not made in good faith.3 A
third application resulted in a 3-2 decision of the Appellate Division,
the majority refusing to let the applicant see a list of his fellow-stock-
holders, which he sought to enable him to ask them to join in a stock-
holder's suit he had instituted.39 The decision is so illogical that it cannot
32. Matter of Bergstein, 270 App. Div. 834, 61 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dept, 1946).
33. Matter of Wheeler, 115 N.Y.L.J. 30 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 1946, Johnson, J.) (Wheeler
Shipbuilding Corp.); Gray v. Induction Heating Corp., 115 N.Y.L.J. 1594 (Sup. Ct.
April 24, 1946, O'Brien, J.).
34. Matter of Evans, 116 N.Y.L.J. 716 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 1946, Sneed, J.) (J. H.
Evans & Sons, Inc.). Cf. the cases cited in note 38 infra where inspection of the stock
book alone was sought and denied on the ground of bad faith. Such decisions are difficult
to reconcile with Schulman v. Louis Dejonge & Co., 270 App. Div. 147, 149, 59 N.Y.S.2d
119, 122 (1st Dept. 1945), wherein the Appellate Division ruled that the proper procedure
when bad faith has been charged is to grant an alternative order directing a trial of this
issue.
35. In re Moran, 115 N.Y.L.J. 1619, (Sup. Ct. April 25, 1946, Johnson, J.).
36. Matter of Ellis, 115 N.Y.L.J. 2019 (Sup. Ct. May 21, 1946, Norton, J.) (John A.
Lynch Co., Inc.).
37. Matter of Rooney, 115 N.Y.L.J. 1032 (Sup. Ct., March 15, 1946, Miller, J.)
(Yawman and Erbe Mfg. Co.).
38. Walsh v. Wood Newspaper Machinery Corp., 115 N.Y.L.J. 1816, (Sup. Ct. May
8, 1946, O'Brien, J.). After dlelivery of the address here printed, the Appellate Division,
First Department, by a 3-2 vote disallowed on the ground of bad faith an inspection of the
stock book sought under GEN. CoRp. LAW § 10. Matter of Tate, 117 N.Y.L.J. 1557 (App.
Div. 1st Dept. April 22, 1947) (Sonotone Corp.).
39. Matter of Baker v. Macfadden Publications, 270 App. Div. 440, 59 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1st Dept. 1946), leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted, 270 App. Div. 840, 61
N.Y.S.2d 912 (lst Dept. 1946).
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be fitted into a coherent analysis of stockholder's rights. The case is
now pending in the Court of Appeals, where reversal seems probable.
During the past year there was also one case of "man bites dog"; a
large corporation endeavored to enjoin a former officer from using a list
of the stockholders he had already obtained. The court declared that if
the defendant's conduct is wrongful "it can only be on the theory that it
was improper and wrongful for a corporate officer to obtain a list of its
stockholders for the purpose of accomplishing a change of management,
irrespective of whether or not the change was sought in the best inter-
ests of the corporation itself." The court refused to enjoin the former
officer. A touch of color is added by the circumstance that the old man-
agement was headed by Serge Rubenstein and it was the directors al-
leged to be under his influence who unsuccessfully tried to prevent the
stockholders' list from being used to oust them."'
It appears from the cases, therefore, that the right of a stockholder
to inspect the books of his corporation and to learn the names of his fel-
low-stockholders is now the most enforceable of all the stockholder's
rights.
III
A third feature, required by the shareholder to manage his corporation,
is the power to hold the directors accountable for misconduct in office.
Once again the surrender by stockholders-to-be of this right is some-
times arranged by promoters and their attorneys when the corpora-
tion's charter is drafted, usually in the form of a provision purporting
to relieve directors from equitable restrictions while dealing with them-
selves.
Some courts, including New York, hold the directors accountable
despite the "blank check" given them by the charter." Redress then is
secured through stockholder's derivative suits, which rapidly increased
in number after 1933, when Congressional disclosures made known to
stockholders how some directors and officers were looting their corpora-
tions.
The corporate immunity which promoters tried unsuccessfully to
secure by charter provision is now supplied by legislation in a number of
states, including New York. This legislation purports to require "secur-
ity for costs," but was intended to and, in operation, has resulted in
killing off virtually all stockholder litigation affecting large corpora-
tions.42 I am inclined to believe that, whatever the legislators may have
40. Panhandle Producing & Refining Co., v. Muller, 115 N.Y.LJ. 1855 (Sup. Ct.
May 10, 1946, Miller, J.).
41. Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 170 N.Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dept.
1918) ; ef. Everett v. Phillips et al., 288 N.Y. 227, 237, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942) ; Contra:
Costa Rica Railway Co.; Ltd. v. Forwood [1900] 1. Ch. 755, af'd, [1901] 1 Ci. 746.
42. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stocklwlders' Dcr',alive Suits in Nctu York, 32
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thought before rushing to enact Section 61-b of the General Corpora-
tion Law, they never suspected the dangerous precedent they were
introducing by making a minimum of wealth prerequisite to invoking
the protection of the courts. We can no longer laugh at Anatole
France's satirical comment: "The law forbids the rich man as well as
the poor to sleep in the park."
This new legislation has been strictly construed. Lewin v. New York
Ambassador, Inc. et al." involved the New York statute, Section 61-b,
and may be of special interest to practitioners. There it was held that
since a voting trust certificate holder is not mentioned in Section 61-b,
he is not subject to its requirements and need not put up security as a
condition to maintaining a suit in equity. The court's decision is sound,
although the exception was not the result of legislative deliberation.
Inasmuch as the danger of secret settlements was the reason urged to
justify the legislation, a question arises as to whether the legislation will
be repealed now that secret settlements, as a practical matter, have
been eliminated by Young v. Higbee Company in the United States Su-
preme Court and Clarke v. Greenberg in the New York Court of Appeals,
decisions which hold that a stockholder who by a secret or "private"
settlement receives more than the fait value of his stock is accountable
to the corporation and lis fellow-stockholders for the excess. 41
Although my records for 1946 show no less than 85 decisions involv-
ing some phase of the derivative suit, I shall call attention to only a very
few of the year's cases. Despite Section 61-b tlhis learning is not purely
academic; it is still relevant in the case of small corporations in the New
York state courts, and in the case of both large and small corporations
in the federal courts of New York.
The three basic questions are: who has capacity to sue, on behalf of
whom, and for what?
The year's decisions have again declared the right to sue, not only of
a stockholder of record, but of an equitable owner, 4 a policyholder in an
insurance company,4" a judgment creditor, 4 and a trustee in bank-
CALIF. L. Rxv. 123 (1944); New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L.
REv. 1 (1947).
43. 61 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Steuer, J.), 62 ibid. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Mc-
Laughlin, J.).
44. Young v. Higbee Company, 324 U.S. 204 (1945); Clark v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y.
146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1946).
45. Law v. Alexander Smith and Sons Carpet Co. et al., 271 App. Div. 706, 68
N.Y.S.2d 143 (1st Dept. 1947), reversing 66 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1946, O'Brien, J.).
46. See Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. 153 F.2d 888, 890
(C.C.A. 2d 1946), aff'd, 67 Sup. Ct. 828 (1947).
47. Thorne Neale & Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Southern Terminal Corp., 270 App. Div. 816,
59 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dept. 1946); Union Dime Say. Bank v. Longchamps, Inc., 116
N.Y.L.J. 239 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1946, Null, J.).
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ruptcy.45 Capacity to sue is now complicated by the doctrine of con-
temporaneous ownership, 49 which requires that a stockholder-complain-
ant in a derivative suit must have been a stockholder at the time of the
transactions complained of.5 Especial note should be made of the fact
that although a stockholder is barred by this restrictive legislation, in
my opinion a director is not; consequently in a small corporation, a
stockholder who can have himself elected a director may thereafter sue
as a director for wrongs before he became a stockholder, if the -wrongs
are within the statute of limitations. The suit is then not technically a
stockholder's suit, but the redress in dollars will be even greater.
A number of decisions found it necessary to point out that, even in a
two-man corporation, plaintiff's suit against his co-stockholder for an
injury to the corporation must be through a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation.51 The term "derivative suit" immediately indicates
that the basis of suit is "derived"; it is on behalf of another. On whose
behalf may suit be maintained? It has long been established that suit
may be maintained on behalf of complainant's ow.n corporation, and
even on behalf of a wholly owned subsidiary-a "double-derivative"
suit.52 During the past year suit was permitted to be instituted on be-
half of a wholly owned subsidiary of a wholly owned subsidiary. This
"triple-derivative" suit occurred in a federal court in New York and
the complaint was upheld, decisively. The Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ruled that not only could such a triple-derivative
suit be maintained, but that it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial
Court to approve a proposed settlement. The Circuit Court said the
settlement should have been disapproved "because on the facts pre-
sented the liability of the individual defendants was indubitable and the
amount of recovery beyond doubt greater than that offered in settle-
ment.153
The basis of complaint-the gravamen of action-is always impor-
tant. The grounds for complaint, sustained by decisions during 1946,
48. Austrian y. Williams, 159 F2d 67 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), afr'd, 15 U.S.L Week 4654
(U.S. June 16, 1947).
49. For a discussion of this problem, see Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholdcrs"
Derivative Sits, 47 CoL L. REv. 1, 7 (1947).
50. N.Y. GFN. CORp. LAw § 61.
51. Kaltman v. Soundview Realty Corp. 65 N.Y.S2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Botein, J.).
And a counterclaim against the plaintiff individually cannot be interposed, Binon v. Boel,
271 App. Div. 505, 66 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dept. 1946).
52. Goldstein v. Groesbeck et at., 142 F2d 422 (GC.A. 2d 1944), cert. dericd, 323
U.S. 737 (1944) ; United States Lines, Inc. et al. v. United States Lines Co. et al., 96 F.2d
148 (C.C.A. 2d 1938) ; Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div. 409, 411, 167 N.Y. Supp. 840, 842
(1st Dept. 1917).
53. Upson v. Otis, 155 F2d 606, 612 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
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were those usually encountered in the past,54 but the surprising feature
is the number of complaints seeking redress for directors' breach of
corporate opportunity. 65 An interesting variation occurred in North v.
Ringling,56 which sustained the sufficiency of a complaint to hold direc-
tors accountable on a charge of gross negligence resulting in the disas-
trous fire which destroyed the Ringling Circus in Hartford, Connecti-
cut. Nowadays one rarely finds this type of derivative suit-a com-
plaint of negligence without a charge of fraud or illegal benefits to the
defendants. The law, of course, is well established that directors are
liable not only for failure to act in good faith but also for failure to exer-
cise that diligence, care, and skill which men of ordinary prudence would
exercise in their own affairs.5 7
In drafting a complaint, one must always consider the Statute of
Limitations. No experienced practitioner will draft a complaint in any
field of law without trying to determine whether suit is barred by the
Statute of Limitations. Especially is this so in derivative litigation
where different periods of limitation apply to different types of miscon-
duct. The most important decision in this field last year was rendered
by the Court of Appeals." The suit there was not by a stockholder, but
by the corporation itself; however, the statute would cause the same
result were a stockholder suing derivatively. The defendants were
charged with causing cancellation of a contract which the corporation
had previously enjoyed and then establishing a rival business to take it
over. The court held that the suit having been instituted before the
amendment to the statute lowering the period of limitations, a 10-year
period was to be allowed, upon the theory of making the defendants
accountable for a resulting trust; this theory, incidentally, would make
the measure of damages the profit gained by the defendants, and not
merely the loss to the corporation.
54. The bases of action generally advanced in the complaints may be gleaned from re-
cent cases listed in Frey, Private Corporations, 94 U. dF PA. L. Rav. 265 (1946).
55. Freedman v. 114 Delancey Corp., 115 N.Y.L.J. 2382 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 1946,
Hammer, J.), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 818, 66 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1st Dept. 1946); Manacher v.
Central Coal Co., Inc., 63 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Koch, J.) ; Lewin v. New York
Ambassador, Inc. et at., supra note 43; same case, also 115 N.Y.L.J. 2063 (Sup. Ct. May
24, 1946, Church, J.).
56. North et al. v. Ringling ef al. 187 Misc. 621, 63 N.Y.S.2d 135, (Sup. Ct. 1946,
Pecora, J.).
57. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880) ; General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y.
18, 23, 109 N.E. 96, 97 (1915). The standard of care in registration statements called for
by the Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (c), as amended, is also defined as that exercised by "a
prudent man in the management of his own property." 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(c) (1940). The standard of care required by the weight of authority is apparently
the care which men of ordinary prudence would exercise "under similar circumstances,"
e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891).
58. Sialkot Importing Corp. v. Berlin, 295 N.Y. 482, 69 N.E.2d 501 (1946).
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Under the present New York laws, a shorter statutory period pro-
tects directors, officers, and stockholders," and this shortened period
starts running-even in the case of a concealed fraud-from the date of
its commission, not from the date of discovery or discoverability of the
fraud." Note, however, that again the legislature, although attempting
to cut down the period of limitations, was careless; even under the new
limitations the period is still 10 years for fraud in a suit against a party
who is neither director, officer, nor stockholder, and therefore not in the
privileged class set up by the amendments to Sections 4S and 49 of the
Civil Practice Act.61 Logically, one would not expect the period of time
within which suit may be brought to be less for those in a fiduciary rela-
tionship than for non-fiduciaries.
Once the complaint has been drafted, a new problem arises: The com-
plainant, in the case of a small corporation, usually fears that his inter-
est in the corporation will be imperilled unless a receiver is appointed
pendente lite. The cases last year were evenly divided: two granting 2
and two refusing 6 3 the appointment of a receiver. In a fifth case, which
seemed to be a strong one for the appointment of a receiver, a receiver-
ship ordered by Special Term was vacated by the Appellate Division-
without opinion. The subject is one on which the profession is waiting
to see the applicable law stated.6 4
The 1946 decisions on examination before trial appear to be routine.
The only one of special interest was a case where the court ruled that
59. The period is now sLx years if the action is for an accounlfng, six years if based
on fraud, and three years if the action is "for waste or for an injury to property or for an
accouwting in connection therewith." N.Y.C.P.A. § 48, subd. 8. (Italics by the author).
60. The term "fraud" is employed in the text in its usual sense in stockholders' deriva-
tive suits where breach of duty by directors is characterized as conduct "in fraud" of the
corporation and its stockholders. In rare instances where there is actual fraud, satisfying
all the prerequisites of a common law action for fraud and deceit, the New York courts
will probably rule that a six year period of limitations applies and starts running only
from the time of discovery of the facts constituting the fraud. See Ziring v. Corrugated
Container Corp., 49 N.Y.S2d 686, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1944, Hooley, J.) ; Gottfried v. Gottfried,
269 App. Div. 413, 417, 56 N.Y.S2d 50, 55 (1st Dept. 1945) ; Myer v. 1yer, 271 App.
Div. 465, 475-6, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 93 (Ist Dept. 1946) ; Am. Cities Power & Light Corp. v.
Williams, 117 N.Y.L.J. 1111 (Sup. Ct. March 21, 1947, Shientag, J.). The foregoing judicial
comments (since the 1942 amendment) on the distinction between "constructive" and "ac-
tual" fraud have been dicta only, the court in each case ruling that "actual" fraud was not
sufficiently alleged.
61. N.Y. Laws 1942, c. 851.
62. In re Jack Martin Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1946, Dickstein,
J.) ; Garten v. Garten, 115 N.Y.LJ. 2558 (Sup. Ct. June 29, 1946, Hammer, J.).
63. 5912 Corp. v. Fuller Searles Corp., 116 N.Y.LU". 263 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 1946,
Dickstein, J.) ; Binon v. Boel, 115 N.Y.L.J. 998 (Sup. Ct. March 13, 1946, -echt, J.).
64. Glickstein v. McGinnis' Broadway Restaurant, Inc., 270 App. Div. 933, 62
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dept. 1946), reversing 115 N.Y.L.J. 1799 (Sup. Ct. May 7, 1946,
O'Brien, 3.).
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defendants had violated an order for inspection when they gave the
books one at a time-an old defense technique, usually tried on an inex-
perienced adversary.15
Another defense strategy is the motion for summary judgment. A
case in which it succeeded during the past year illustrates the type of
case in which it should be made. This was Koff v. Hochschild, 6 where
summary judgment was granted on the basis of res judicata, to wit, an
intervening decision in another stockholder's suit involving the same
cause of action. There were in other cases defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment which proved unsuccessful because not so soundly
based. 7
This first major grouping of the stockholder's "bundle of rights"-
his right to manage the corporation-has all but disappeared. The pro-
moters have sometimes completely eliminated his right to vote, as they
have also tried to deny him the right to inspect or to hold the directors
accountable for misconduct. In the latter two situations, the courts
reached out to protect the stockholder, and the legislatures, in turn, by
nullifying somewhat the efforts of the courts, have thereby, in effect,
taken these "rights" out of the bundle--for, it is idle to talk of "rights"
unless they are enforceable in court.
THE STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE MONEY FROM THE
CORPORATION
The second major grohping of the stockholder's rights concerns his
power to secure money from the corporation, either in the form of de-
clared dividends or of a liquidating dividend on dissolution of the cor-
poration.
In legal theory the directors alone determine when and if dividends
are to be declared. But here, as elsewhere, the court can give relief. Al-
though the cases are few in which a court hag compelled directors to
declare dividends, courts have done so in New York as well as in other
states."
During the past year, in only a single case was the sufficiency of a
complaint to compel declaration of dividends sustained and in that case,
the claim was that dividends were mandatory under the charter, not
discretionary. 9
65. Sanford Gladev. Restbar, Inc., 115 N.Y.L.J. 1392, (Sup. Ct, April 9, 1946, Eder, J,).
66. Koffv. Hochschild, 116 N.Y.L.J. 482 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1946, Eder, J.).
67. Darraugh v. Carrington, 270 App. Div. 932, 62 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1st Dept. 1946),
leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, 270 App. Div. 1014, 63 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1st
Dept. 1946) ; Lustig v. Lustig, 116 N.Y.L.J., 199 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 1946, Hecht, J.).
68. Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204 (3d
Dept. 1930) ; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
69. Koppel v. Middle States Petroleum Corp., 116 N.Y.L.J. 1102 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 30,
1946, Botein, J.), Cf. Matter of Wheeler, 115 N.Y.L.J. 30 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 1946, John-
son, J.).
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The dissolution of a corporation at the suit of a minority stockholder
is just as unusual in this country as a judicial declaration of dividends.
But the courts do acknowledge the power to order dissolution as inci-
dental relief when those in control have been guilty of misconduct. 0
An illustrative case occurred during the past year, where the plaintiff
complained of excessive salaries and other misconduct. The Appellate
Division reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and, in
sending the case back for re-trial, impliedly approved the form of relief
sought--dissolution of the corporation.71
The rarity of dissolution as a form of judicial relief for misconduct
makes almost entirely theoretical the so-called "right" of the stockhold-
er to share in the residual assets of the corporation should it ever be
formally dissolved or liquidated. Large corporations are almost never
liquidated; they are "merged" or reorganized. What the stockholder
then receives is determined by the binding effect, if any, of his so-called
"contract" with the corporation, the next subject to be considered.
THE STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHTS TO MAINTAIN THE ORIGINAL
CORPORATE CONTRACT
The third major grouping of the stockholder's rights concerns his
power to prevent changes in the original contract betwveen the corpora-
tion and its shareholders. When we studied contracts at law school, we
thought, with the naivet6 of a Gertrude Stein, that a contract was a
contract-equally binding on both sides. This faith is not justified in
the case of the corporate charter contract.72 Originally, the charter
contract was considered as inviolable as other contracts and conse-
quently could not be changed if a single stockholder objected, even if
the change was beneficial to the corporation and the stockholders as a
group. This veto power was subject to abuse by individual stockholders
who sometimes demanded and received more than was fair for consent-
ing to a change. Laws were thereupon enacted permitting changes in
70. Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dept. 1931) ; for a
discussion of this problem, see Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abusc-Judicial
Power to %and up a Corporation at the Sdt of a Minority Stockholder, 40 CoL L. Rrv.
220 (1940).
71. Wayland v. Johnston & Collins Co., 270 App. Div. 931, 62 N.Y.S2d 238 (1st
Dept. 1946).
72. Impairment of the obligation of contracts is evaded, constitutionally, by the
reservation of the power to amend corporate charters which is contained in the enabling
general corporation law of almost every state, a reservation inspired by the decision in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819). The stock-
holders, consequently, are deemed to consent in advance to any modifications of the
corporate charter provisions to be made in the future not only under authority of statutes
in force at the time of incorporation but also under authority to be given by future amend-
ments of the state corporation laws-which in many states are custom-made to suit the
desire of corporate managements.
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the contract if approved by a specified percentage of those concerned,
and giving the right to objectors to demand and receive payment for
their aliquot share in the corporation. To meet the competition of
states like Delaware, New York has gone far in permitting changes of
every conceivable nature. During the past year the New York Court of
Appeals, in Anderson v. International Minerals,3 upheld the constitu-
tionality of such legislative authorization. This practice would not be
subject to criticism if the objectors who are forced out of the going
enterprise were adequately safeguarded in their appraisal rights, but
they are not. In a recent instance, 69 holders of preferred stock in a
Delaware corporation learned after six years of litigation that the alter-
native to consenting to what they deemed an inequitable reclassification
of preferred stock in a solvent corporation was that they could be forced
by a Delaware court of equity to surrender their stock for less than par
although holders of common stock in the old corporation had received
recognition.74
There are several hard-hitting law review comments on legislation
and judicial decisions which permit such a state of affairs." Certainly,
this final group of "rights" has been so weakened that the stockholder
must rely, as Professors Berle and Means said 15 years ago, "not on
legal rights," but "on a set of expectations that the men who compose
the management and control will deal fairly with his interest."7
It is possible some may feel that this cumulative discussion of.the
rapidly vanishing rights of the stockholder is unfair because not all the
"rights" are obliterated in a single corporation. Unfortunately, how-
ever, there are corporations where practically every element in the
"bundle of rights" is negatived. The Pennroad Corporation, in which
some 150,000 investors made a capital contribution at the time of incor-
poration, may serve as an example. It was incorporated in Delaware in
1929. The stock of the newly-formed corporation was simultaneously
placed in a voting trust, so that purchasers who furnished the capital
received in return only voting trust certificates, which effectually barred
them for at least 10 years from any voting control over the manage-
ment. Although the highest court in Delaware had several years earlier
ruled that the "no inspection" provision in a charter is void, the Penn-
road charter contained not only the conventional prohibition against
inspection of the books by stockholders, but also a further provision
that the corporation should not be required to make known to stock-
73. Anderson v. International Minerals, 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E.2d 573 (1946).
74. Root v. York Corp., 50 A.2d 52 (1946) ; see also Hornstein, Cumulative Dividends
in Delaware Corporations, 117 N.Y.LJ. 1278 (April 2, 1947).
75. Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporalions-From Vested Right to
Mirage, 57 HIv. L. REV. 894 (1944) ; 46 YALE L.J. 985 (1937) and earlier articles referred
to in note 2 thereof; also 43 COL. L. REv. 230 (1943), 44 MicH. L. Rav. 659 (1946).
76. BEar. AND MEANs, MoDERN CORPOATION AND PRIVATE PaonrOETY, 188 (1932).
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holders any statement concerning its assets or liabilities. The usual
exculpatory clause for directors was present too. Delaware's so-called
liberality in permitting alterations in the contract rights of sharehold-
ers, despite their objections, has been notorious for many years, and
no case has" come to my attention in which a Delaware court ever or-
dered a declaration of dividends or dissolved a corporation at the suit
of a minority stockholder. It is not surprising, then, that the stock
market appraisal of the value of Pennroad voting trust certificates at
one time dropped to almost nothing. Even speculators are reluctant to
bid for an engraved certificate showing that someone made a capital
contribution but received in return for it few or no enforceable rights.
Fortunately, the courts in most states have always found legal tools
to effectuate justice. But the courts cannot act unless a matter is before
them. That is why the right of the stockholder to resort to the courts
should be maintained. The Pennroad Corporation is again an object
lesson. As a result of the disclosures by the Wheeler investigation in
1938, suits were instituted by a number of stockholders who previously
had had no inkling of what had transpired. The small number of shares
owned by the complainants was the subject of ridicule by The Pennroad
Corporation in its annual report to stockholders, but the result of the
suit was not a laughing matter. A judgment of over $23,000,000 was
awarded after trial. This award, however, was reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, which held that the Delaware state statute of limita-
tions should have been applied and the suit therefore barred.1 There-
after, the suit was settled for a cash payment to the Pennroad Corpora-
tion of $15,000,000, a tidy sum which added approximately 30% to the
assets of this corporation."
The Pennroad Corporation, organized under the most reputable aus-
pices, has been used simply to demonstrate first, what ultimately de-
velops when the stockholder gives up most of his "bundle of rights,"
and secondly, the importance and cash value to a corporation of the
rights of its stockholders to appeal to the courts.
CONCLUSION
The business corporation is a vital element in our economic structure.
For half a century, however, public attention was directed to corporate
relations with the public (the consumer) and with labor. Ripley's eye-
opening series of Atlantic Monthly articles in 1926-1927," shortly fol-
lowed by Berle and Means' thoroughly documented analysis, 3 spot-
77. Overfield v. Pennroad, 146 F.2d 889 (C.C-A. 3d 1944), rcroemring 42 F. Supp.
586 (E.D. Pa. 1941), and 48 id. 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
78. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 43 A2d 721 (Del. Ch. 1945), aff'd, 47 A2d 479 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 620 (1947). The payment vas actually made
on Feb. 19, 1947.
79. Reprinted in RiPLEY, MAIN STaur Am WVA. SmREnr (1927).
80. BEuL aw MEANs, MoDERnx CoRaoRATio Am Pniv.rn Pnormay (1932).
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lighted intracorporate problems. Management's relations with the
stockholders, it is now appreciated, are also a subject of public concern,
not only to do justice in specific cases, but. to assure that investors are
not discouraged from making future capital contributions.
Despite the considerable advance in investor protection effected by
the federal securities legislation since 1933, much can still be done. 81
A possible solution is to prescribe that where a charter is offered for fil-
ing-if the assets, whether raised by stock or bond issues, exceed
$5,000,000-theie must be review and approval by an official with more
than purely ministerial powers. Standards could be specified requiring
rejection of the papers where the charter includes provisions already
declared invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or where the corporate structure lends itself to unfair or inequitable
distribution of voting power among the security holders. Suggestive
standards will be found in the Investment Company Act of 1940.82
Conserving the stockholder's right to vote, of course, will not alone
eliminate the possibility of intracorporate abuse. Even where the right
to vote is vested in the stockholders, the management frequently relies
on the nature of the proxy system to protect itself from ouster, however
flagrant its misconduct. Proxy practices still current in corporations
not subject to SEC surveillance were graphically disclosed in a 1946
SEC report to Congress.8"
Legislative efforts to protect stockholders would, however, prove to
be a boomerang if interpreted as a substitute for the stockholder's right
to invoke the aid of the courts. It is encouraging, therefore, to observe
in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that, de-
spite a 5-4 division on the immediate issue of the applicability of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, all nine justices agreed on the right
of a policyholder, as well as a stockholder, to maintain a derivative suit
on behalf of the company.84 Should the right to resort to the courts be
taken away-directly or indirectly-nothing will be left of the stock-
holder's so-called rights.
81. Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41
Coi. L. REV. 405 (1941).
82. A registered investment company may not issue non-voting stock, § 18(i) ; may
not issue more than two classes of stock, one class of preferred and one of common,
§ 18(c) ; may not issue stock for property or services, but only for cash or securities,
§ 23(a) ; may not issue warrants good for more than 120 days, § 18(d) ; may not issue
voting trust certificates, § 20(b) ; may not have cross-ownership or circular ownership
which would make it impossible to dislodge the management, § 20(c) ; may not purchase
its own stock except in a manner insuring fair treatment to all security holders, § 23(c).
All the foregoing section references are to the INVESTMENT COMPANY Aar of 1940, 54 STAT.
789 et seq., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1940).
83. Proposal to Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities, H.R. Doc. No. 672,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
84. Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 828 (1947).
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